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• A Biographical Sketch
Alexander Haim Pekelis was born in Odessa in 1902.
In 1920 he escaped the Russian Revolution, moving first to Germany (Leipzig), then, in 1921, 
to Austria (Vienna), and finally, in 1924, to Italy (Florence and Rome, 1924-1938).
His graduate thesis (1928) was published two years later under the title ll diritto come volontà 
costante (“The Law as a Constant Will”).
In the early 1930s he was appointed as Libero Docente (professorship, non-tenured) of 
Philosophy of Law at the University of Rome, where he taught until 1938.
In 1938, because of the Fascist Racial Laws, he fled Italy, and in 1941, after three years spent 
in Paris as an attorney, he came to the United States as a refugee.
In 1941, his first year in New York City, he was appointed professor of Sociology at the New 
School for Social Research, and graduated in law from Columbia School of Law.
In 1945 he was appointed Chief Consultant to the Commission on Law and Social Action of 
the America Jewish Congress.
On December 28, 1946, he died in an airplane accident near Shannon Airport, in Ireland.
• Works of Pekelis
Pekelis is the author of one book and several essays:
• Il diritto come volontà costante [“The Law as a Constant Will”], Padua: Cedam, 1930;
• Saggio sui rapporti tra diritto e morale [“Essay on Morality and the Law”], Padua: 
Cedam, 1932;
• Azione [“Legal Action”], in Nuovo Digesto Italiano, Turin: UTET, 1937;
• Law and Social Action – Select Essays of Alexander H. Pekelis, edited by Milton R. 
Konvitz, Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950. 
• Works on Pekelis
Apart from a number of reviews of his Il diritto and his posthumous Law and Social Action, 
five critical analyses of Pekelis’ idea of law and legal action exist:
•          Alessandro Levi, Il diritto (obbiettivo) come volontà costante (dello Stato), in 
Temi Emiliana, 1931, 41ff.;
• Benedetto Croce, Conversazioni Critiche – Serie Quinta, Bari: Laterza, 1939, at 
283-286;
• Giovanni Tarello, Quattro buoni giuristi per una cattiva azione, in Materiali per una 
storia della cultura giuridica, Vol. VII, 1977, 147ff.; 
• Angelo Dondi, Una pagina di Pekelis rivisitata, in Materiali per una storia della 
cultura giuridica, Vol. XII, 1982, 131ff.;
• Edward Hicks, Theoreticians: Questions Left Open, in Carol Weisbrod (ed.), Cultural 
Differences and the State, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002, 101ff.
See also: 
i) Carla Pekelis [A. Pekelis’ wife], La mia versione dei fatti, Palermo: Sellerio 
Editore, 1996 [Engl. Trans. My Version of the Facts, Evanston (IL): Marlboro 
Press and Northwestern University Press, 2005];
ii) M. Giuliani, Da Odessa a Firenze: Alexander Pekelis (1902-1946), ebreo russo 
emigrato in Italia, in Amicizia Ebraico-Cristiana, Nuova Serie, XXXIV, 3-4 
Luglio-Dicembre 1999, 113ff.
M. Mastrogregori, Il Caso Pekelis – Croce, Russo, Calamandrei e la protezione 
degli studiosi ebrei nell’autunno 1938, in Storiografia, Vol. 6, 2002, 127ff.
•  Pekelis and the Law: The Italian Years (1930-1937) - The Action of the State 
• Introductory
The main topics on which Pekelis most contributed during his Italian scholarly years 
(1930-1938) could be summarized as follows:
• The role of the State as the main source of the law (positive law);
• The relations (if any) between law and morality;
• The meaning (both as strictly legal as well as socio-political) of the legal and formal  act 
starting the civil process -- and in this sense a legal action [“azione processuale”].
• Pekelis and the Anti-Formalist Italian Movement
In Italy in the 1920s-1940s, a number of young scholars (notably: Max Ascoli, 1898-1978; 
Alexander Pekelis, 1902-1946; Tullio Ascarelli, 1903-1959; Gino Gorla, 1906-1992; and 
Bruno Leoni, 1913-1967), strongly influenced by Benedetto Croce and his anti-positivistic 
doctrine, stressed the idea of the creative (but not unbounded) nature of the interpretation of the 
law.
 Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Croce was a strong opponent of the so called “Scuola 
del diritto libero” -- having its “noble ancestor” in the German Freirechtsschule. 
Critiques addressed by Croce towards legal formalism (here intended in an extremely broad 
sense) have their core in the critique of the law as a philosophical realm; in contrast, Croce 
argues the law could be studied only from an empirical and pragmatic point of view.
This is a good statement, because it avoids certain excesses focused on totally-free judicial legal 
reasoning, but contradicts as well the assumption of legal system as a logical system. 
It is a matter of fact that legal reasoning faces to logical rules (the rules governing the use of 
legal arguments), but it is undeniable that the use of juridical logic obeys to political more than 
logic claims.   
In a more general sense, the approach to the law shared by these academics was: 
• Anti-formalistic, in the sense that the law was not the reign of the pure logic, because it 
is strictly interconnected with economics, and thus the meaning of the legal rule (the 
norm) is related to its interpretation by the judge. The interpretation being not merely a 
declaration of the meaning of the law (which per se does not exist), but a creative act 
giving a certain meaning to legal rules (as an ex post outcome), the role played by 
interpreters -- both scholars and judges -- is the very core of the law enforcement, as a 
direct consequence of the interpretation; 
• Anti-conceptualistic, in the sense that the law has to be intended as a body of rules 
regulating the economic and social needs of the society. Along this path, indeed, the 
jurist does not have a dogmatic role as theorist of the legal system, because he assumes 
the more complex role of social engineer who puts in order an open society, in the 
sense of a dynamic society.  
From the specific anti-formalistic but Crocian point of view, Pekelis criticizes the “Scuola del 
diritto libero”: starting from the observation that law are often imperfect, it appeals to the 
freedom of judging.  But -- writes Pekelis -- the relinquishment of every order, depending on 
the lack of a perfect order, is a weakness which will be soon regretted: anyone who does not 
want to be subjected to the will of the law, is going to be the victim of a lot of abuses.
However, Pekelis, who is an anti-positivistic jurist (this is a point which will require a more 
thorough analysis because of the complexity of the Pekelis’ place within the Italian legal 
literature, but here I assume this qualification without discussing it), admits that the judge-
made-law is an atypical source of law: the specific task of jurisdiction is the clearing of the 
abstractness of the law.    
• Pekelis and the Law: State vs. Individual?    
In this tentative paper, my localized task is to focus: i) on the Pekelis’ conception of law, and ii) 
on the logical outcomes he derives from this conception as to the relations between the State 
and the individual, from the point of view of the formation of the state legal order.
• On the Concept of Law
From a chronologically point of view, it is necessary to start with Pekelis’ main Italian 
publication: Il diritto come volontà costante.
It is unnecessary to quote here many passages from the book, especially because of the Pekelis’ 
style, which often makes recourse to the difficult neo-idealistic terminology.  
Pekelis’ approach to the law along the 1930s could be summarized by these following points, 
which I’ll try to make more clear and at times problematic.
The main distinction -- assumed as the very basis of the Il diritto -- is between thinking and 
willing: both of them are activities of the spirit and their difference is intrinsically evident: in 
other words, thinking and willing are two fundamental attitudes of the spirit considered in its 
unity.  
If at the very basis of the concept of Science is the knowledge of the laws governing the world, 
at the very basis of the concept of Law there is the will, the intention of certain laws (in the 
sense of rules, norms) prescribing certain conducts or/and avoiding others.
The will of laying down the law is the will of having an order, and in this sense the law is an 
appearance of a certain order.
• The Law of the State and the Law of Individual 
At this point, a clarification is necessary on two different matters: i) what is the particular 
element that differs the individual will from the state will as to the concept of the law, and ii) 
what is the relation between the different sources of the law.
Focusing on the concept of legal rule, Pekelis does not seem to differentiate between the 
individual will and the will of the State: in both cases, in fact, the core of the law -- if it is a 
legal rule -- is the will expressed in causal relations. 
Focusing on the sources of the law, Pekelis criticizes the idea of the State as the only source of 
law: the law (in the sense of a set of legal rules) does it exist also out of the State, and also 
without the State; in this sense, Pekelis appreciates the so called doctrine of the plurality of legal 
orders. 
In spite of this, the State is the social subject from which the strongest legal will derives, in the 
sense of juridical will: the State is merely the most powerful of the social organizations.
As a logical consequence of his arguments, Pekelis criticizes the idea of the sociality of the law 
as one of its intrinsic features.
The sociality of the law is just a pragmatic element, not being it at the core of the definition and 
notion of the law. On the contrary, from an aprioristic point of view, the law is a category of 
the spirit in its volitive attitude, that is the logical category of causality.
There is sociological order -- or a natural order, such as the order existing in the world --, and a 
legal order -- or an artificial order -- that exists in the will.
From this perspective, the definition of law proposed by Pekelis covers only two elements: will 
and causality. If the element of sociality is added to these two elements, the very essence 
(displayed by means of an aprioristic and logical approach) of the definition of law will perish: 
“In defining the law as a will, we want to state the spirituality, individuality, and personality of 
its origin.” 
The famous phrase: Ubi Societas, Ibi Ius, has to be converted into a more appropriate: Sine 
Persona, Nullum Ius.
Pekelis devotes special attention to this point: indeed, he admits that a social group normally is 
or could be a source of rules, if and when that social group will be carrying out certain rules 
binding upon each member; but this system of rules, that is an order, is not, accordingly to 
Pekelis, a legal order; this order is not a legal system, and these rules are not laws in the usual 
sense of the word. 
Why? Because what is lacking is the existence of a will: the laws of nature are the laws of a 
natural order not-determined by man, while juridical laws are the laws of the “ought-to-be”, a 
category of the will, indeed determined by men. 
• The Morality of Law
If and only if man’s will acts in a higher, “spiritual”, form, that is the form of causality, and so 
the form of the law, can a legal order rise up: Ubi Voluntatis Ordo, Ibi Ius.
The law is a spiritual activity per causas, bound to causal nexes.
The causal form of the law is the universality and abstractness of the law: if A, then B. 
To understand what is law, from a structural point of view, and what just law is, from a moral 
point of view, it is necessary to have recourse to a strictly formal criterion : the will to act in an 
identical way in all identical cases is the form of the law, and this (form of the) law is in itself a 
just law, deriving from a just will.
The employment of the same rule for all analogous cases is the most extraordinary guarantee of 
the equity of the rule.
In this sense, the word “justice” is simply the choice of a criterion of judgment, and not the 
content of this criterion.
Starting from the Latin saying: Iustitia est Constans et Perpetua Voluntas Ius Suum Cuique 
Tribuendi, Pekelis points out that the core of this sentence is not in the phrase Ius Suum Cuique 
Tribuendi, but in the phrase Iustitia est Constans et Perpetua Voluntas: indeed, it is extremely 
difficult to know what is due to anyone; nevertheless, the quoted saying makes an identification 
between justice and the choice of a criterior; the worst inequality operates when recurring 
indifferently to double standards.   
Within this system of causal relations, a legal rule, that is the law in the proper sense, is an 
ethical act: “Per cattiva che appaia una disposizione, se é veramente legge, ha pur sempre un 
valore etico […].”
The distinction between thinking and willing, and thus between “to be” and “ought to be”, is 
reflected in the distinction between the law of nature and juridical laws.
In order to surpass this dualism, Pekelis argues it is necessary to stress the idea of a will of 
action: this will of action is a bridge between the “to be” and the “ought to be”, and in this sense 
it is a completely ethical will.
The concept of the morality of law -- a morality that is a consequence of the acting of the will – 
is thoroughly investigated by Pekelis in his essay published in 1932 (and defined by himself as 
the first self-critical revision of his book). Just law is the law as a consequence of a certain will, 
because the regularity and constancy of the acting will is, at its very essence, a legal will and a 
just will.
Within this relation between the law and the morality, there is a central point: the law as 
morality is unitary, while the law as legislation is a multifarious.
Pekelis suggests that morality, per se, is nothing other and nothing more than concrete legal 
will; in any different case, it will be an abstract and impracticable ideal.
So, the more legal the will, the more moral it is. From this point of view -- both legal and moral 
--, morality and law are perfectly coincident. 
Legal will, moral will, and good will fare the same reality in its becoming. When a will is 
expressed by someone in the world, this will is action, freedom, and pure morality via-à-vis the 
person expressing his or her will; and it is intended as coaction, necessity, and law by the 
external world, to which this action is addressed.   
Every individual action -- that is both legal and moral -- is at the same time coaction with other 
individuals.
In the beginning stages of the development of the State, referring to the notion of sovereignty, 
there is no any superior to whom the other members of the society are subject or dependent, but 
there are people who obeying their own moral imperative are willing and acting. 
At the very beginning, indeed, neither orders nor obedience, but only action.
• The Morality of the State
This action, free in itself, is the very source of every human association -- family, society, State.
In this sense -- writes Pekelis -- every State is per se a democratic State: not because the State 
acts on the basis of the general will of its members -- to whom its action is directed --: this 
hypothesis is totally wrong being unreal; but because the action of the State is unanimously 
accepted by all members who, through their wills, give rise to this action.
If, referring to the State, this concept is intended as a type of power, it is quite incorrect to 
identify it with the nation, namely, the people living within its borders. It is better to recognize 
the truth of the consideration that there does exist an identification between the State and the 
Government, between the State and the Class taking power. Pekelis argues that there is a 
continuous modification of the members of the class in power, with a consequent change of the 
will of the State.
The moral character of the will of the State explains why the law of the State can be considered 
the morality of the State: legislation means the perfect correspondence between the will of the 
State and the will of the human beings acting as legislators.
With reference to the ethical nature of the State, it will be legally constituted only by means of 
its action expressed in a causal form, and the existence of a causal action as the source law, has 
per se an ethical value; therefore, the ethical State is intrinsically a legally constituted State 
(“Stato di diritto”).
Pekelis admits a moral conflict between the action of the State and the action of the individual: 
in this case, the individual will legitimately react against the State, opposing the latter with his 
will, his law, his action, inherently free and moral.
This consideration, according to Pekelis,  explains: i) why the members of the group in power 
accept and support the doctrine of the Ethical State, and ii) why groups out of power look at the 
action of the State as the action of a group which acts against them. Groups out of power deny 
the ethicalness of the State; the action of the State is considered as a legitimate action, arising 
from a legitimate social organization, but not a moral action in the sense of an action pursuing 
an ethical goal. 
At this point in his reasoning, Pekelis specifies that the State derives from the concourse of a 
multiplicity of individual wills, in the sense that these wills are the essential components of the 
law of the State, and are the main source of the State. 
Finally, it is the law which is the source of the State, and not the State the source of the law.
• The Role of Legal Action
In this framework focused on the concept of action, Pekelis in his Azione discusses the primacy 
of the procedural law (“diritto processuale”) over substantial law (“diritto sostanziale”), 
claiming that this primacy is the consequence of the constant phenomenon in the legal systems 
of the XX century, that is, the progressive substitution of the individual by the State. 
The action of the State is the main center of legal and social action in modern times: the 
individual acts not directly but through the State. 
In this sense, and from a critical point of view, it could be said that the conception of a State 
stressed by Pekelis gives us a notion of the State so strong and so overcharging that the 
individual is absorbed within it, with the probable consequence that the singular rights of the 
individual will be brought  into the general action of the State.
• Pekelis and the Law: The American Years (1941-1946) - The Jurisprudence of Welfare
In his American scholarly work, Pekelis -- soundly with his idea on the centrality of the action 
of the State -- argues that by means of action of the State social goals must be pursued. 
One of the most interesting essays is his A Jurisprudence of Welfare, which, at its very basis, 
argues the idea of the necessity of the continuance of the struggle against formalism, in the 
sense of legal dogmatism and conservatism.
• The Heritage of American Legal-Realism
According to Pekelis, in Europe, antiformalistic doctrines remained confined within 
Universities. The practical legal world (legislators, lawyers, and judges) refused them, being 
faithful to the principle of legal certaintly and the function of judges to declare what is right and 
wrong -- according to the written law -- and not to create the law. 
All these anti-formalistic doctrines, apart from their specific differences, have at least three main 
characteristics in common: 
• an insistence on the gap between what the law appears to be in the books and what it is 
in reality; 
• a feeling for the dissonance between the abstractness of general rules and the 
individuality of concrete cases; 
• an awareness of the creative nature of the judicial function. 
“If judges are unwilling to admit, even to themselves, the degree of their freedom to create law, 
this is because it is easier to exercise authority by predicating it upon a law placed beyond the 
control of those who declare it.” 
Pekelis explains that sometimes judges are haunted by an unconscious “father complex”, a 
childlike longing for legal certainty, in a world of chaotic dangers. Hence they dissect statutory 
provisions, weigh divergent lines of precedents and select admissible items of evidence, 
destined to form the so-called facts of a controversy, knowing little, and telling less, of the 
motives that actually prompted their choice, and of their bias and favor. 
The truth of the matter is that in the main judges are lawmakers, not law-finders.
In the United States, with reference to Legal Realism, doctrines of judicial freedom were (and 
still are) at any rate a fitting rationalization of the position in which judges and administrators 
found themselves by virtue of American constitutional and legislative technique. 
In a sense, the United States has no written Constitution. 
The great clauses of the Constitution, just like the more important provisions of fundamental 
statutes, contain no more than an appeal to the decency and wisdom of those with whom the 
responsibility for their enforcement rests. To say that compensation must be "just," the 
protection of the laws "equal," punishments neither "cruel" nor "unusual," bails or fines not 
"excessive," searches and seizures not "unreasonable," deprivation of life, liberty or property 
not "without due process," is but to give a foundation to the law-making, rather Constitution-
making, activity of judges, left free to define what is cruel, reasonable, excessive, due, or for 
that matter, equal. 
In their turn, Congress and state legislatures have long adopted the same technique. 
The consequences of this consciousness are considerable, according to Pekelis. 
First of all, when Legal Realists became judges or administrators they found less enthusiasm 
for the emphasis upon the discrepancy between books and reality. 
Somehow, first-person realism -- "law is what we judges do in fact, not what we say” -- 
sounded far less appealing. It was hardly helpful to persist in defining law as the prediction of 
judicial behavior, since no judge could regulate his own behavior by trying to predict it. 
If it is true that the mere presence of an observer influences the reality being observed, the 
nature of the judicial process had to change when judges began to philosophize about it or 
when philosophers, searching the reality of judicial law, became themselves the reality they 
were looking for. 
The resulting transformation of the judicial process is not everywhere equally apparent or deep. 
But, on the whole, leading legal opinion knows that policy-making only begins with the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment of a statute. 
Judges in their turn avow that they cannot be expected to be more certain about the course of 
their action or more infallible than other men, including legislators.
2. The Jurisprudence of Welfare
In terms of a new approach to the judiciary, the beginnings of it is what Pekelis called a 
“jurisprudence of welfare”. 
In other words, judges, who have long been asking themselves a series of questions about 
canons of construction, intentions of the legislators or lines of judicial authority, may be about 
to ask themselves the only question that really matters, according to Pekelis: "Which course of 
my action -- which rule of law -- is going to serve best the general welfare of the society I am 
sworn to serve?".
And judges may be inclined to ask this question openly and explicitly, and attempt to answer it 
intelligently, with the help of all available data that the social sciences can offer.
A responsible judicial approach based on the utilization of such data could build upon 
foundations already laid by legal writers in many fields of public and private law. 
Jurisprudence of welfare is thus fundamentally an educational problem. 
The clear separation of law schools from schools of politics, economics and sociology has led 
-- writes Pekelis -- to a corresponding separation of the scientific activity of the two groups: 
“Quite naturally, within each of them, a trend away from the slippery borders has developed. 
The combined effect of these trends has created a scientific no-man's land which has become 
covered by dense conceptual and semantic hedges. A common effort is needed to cut them 
back.”
Participation of the social sciences in the development of a welfare jurisprudence could bring, 
argues Pekelis, the normative elements in social science into the light of consciousness, and 
thus contribute to a healthy development of social theory. 
In short, welfare jurisprudence may offer an opportunity to answer not only the question: 
“How do and how should legal institutions shape social reality?”, but also: “How important for 
the life of a society are social sciences ?”
Welfare jurisprudence may thus become a testing ground of the incidence of legal institutions 
and of the relevance of social studies.
Obviously, some problem could arise from this perspective.
In the first place it could be said that the welfare question should be asked, and the available 
social data should be considered, not by judges but by legislators. 
And this proposition, in turn, will be justified by various considerations from various points of 
view. 
• If the government is a government of laws and not of men, we must be ruled by general 
and impersonal propositions formulated without regard to individual litigants, applying 
with the same rigor to all of them. 
• If courts are left with the power to ask the welfare question they will be tempted to 
change their answers according to their personal beliefs, and this would gravely impair 
the stability of the legal system. There is a particular injustice and hardship in "judicial 
legislation" because unlike a new statue which is binding only for the future, the 
decision of the courts purports to be declaratory of the law, and thus applies 
retroactively.
• If the welfare of the people requires a change in the law it must be made by the people 
themselves, through their duly elected representatives, composing their legislative 
assemblies.
A second group of objections may center on the notion that the pursuer's full awareness of his 
goal does not necessarily promote the success of his pursuit. 
It may be maintained, indeed, that most lawmakers have asked the welfare question, at least 
unconsciously, and that judges too must have done so, to the extent that they were lawgivers. 
Against the background of these specific objections, Pekelis stressed the following points:
• The awareness of his lawmaking function and a conscious pursuit of welfare do not 
necessarily make a man, or a judge, a good or better lawgiver. 
• Even if judges should be perfectly conscious of what they are doing, people, for their 
own good, should not be told of the degree of judicial freedom, and, least of all, in 
judicial opinions.
Finally, objections and critics may challenge the usefulness of injecting the welfare concept into 
the judicial process: 
• The agreement that laws, judge-made and other wises, should be good (or serve the 
general welfare) is as general as the disagreement on what serves the common good.
• The difficulty is not solved by reference to the social sciences, for there is no agreement 
among social scientists in general, or even among the scholars of a single branch of 
social science, on what welfare is, on what the means of furthering it are, and on 
whether or not it is proper or possible for the social sciences to give guidance for the 
solution of social problems. 
• If some social scientists should prove willing to provide such guidance, the result might 
be intolerable paternalism, a tyrannical government by experts.
Pekelis remarks, on the contrary, on the relation between laws and welfare, that “whether or not 
a type of legislation which would eliminate the need for judicial lawmaking is desirable or 
possible, precious little of such legislation is to be found on the books today.” 
The weight of traditional common law ideology, and the techniques of American political and 
legislative machinery, have joined forces to multiply the instance wherein legislators give 
judges no better guidance than adjectives such as "just," "reasonable," "fair," "convenient," 
"adequate" or "proper". 
And the greater the strategic value of a given provision, the greater the likelihood that the 
legislative majority needed for its adoption will be gathered through the use of "neutral" words 
which do not prejudge the issue. 
3. The Jurisprudence of Welfare and the Rule of Law
According to Pekelis, the ideal of a jurisprudence of welfare is in no way inconsistent with that 
of government by law.
The notion that government by law presupposes and requires a legislative lawmaking 
monopoly may have been justified in a given historical and political setting, but, considered in 
itself, it is totally unwarranted:
“Such a monopoly is neither sufficient nor necessary for the preservation of the ideal of 
government by law: on the one hand, statutes, and, indeed, constitutions, may and sometimes 
do contain ad personam provisions which fly in the face of that ideal; on the other, the ideal 
has often celebrated its highest expression in catholic rules of purely judicial origin.”
So, the real test is not by whom an order is given, nor whether it is given in a general and 
impersonal form, nor the occasion of particular litigation, but whether or not the order is 
predicated upon a maxim capable of acquiring that universality which characterizes law in its 
higher sense. 
Welfare jurisprudence should never attempt to escape this fundamental requirement. It would 
misconstrue the essential relation between law and welfare if it neglected the truth that law is an 
element in and indeed, the foundation of welfare itself. 
The question "what is good for our society ?" is crucial, and must be asked by all those -- be 
they legislators, judges or administrators -- who are in fact entrusted with lawmaking functions. 
And it must be answered with the help of all pertinent non-legal data, originating in the social 
sciences or elsewhere. The answer itself, however, must be a law-making one.
Jurisprudence of welfare 
“must not be corrupted into a jurisprudence of expediency. The expediencies of specific 
situations must be valued from a general viewpoint and shaped into an intelligible pattern. A 
true jurist, mindful of the general welfare, instead of merely investigating what specific judicial 
action or administrative measure would best serve the public welfare in individual situations, 
will ask himself what canon of action can best serve that purpose, upon what maxim, capable 
of becoming a universal law, can the specific measure be predicated.”
Concrete cases cannot be decided by general propositions, but neither can they be decided 
without them. 
Even in the most narrow sense welfare is measured not only by the absolute amount of goods 
and services enjoyed by men, but by their relative distribution as well. 
The quest for a conformity to rules, for a recognizable pattern of action, for an ordo voluntatis, 
is nothing less than a quest for 
“harmony and beauty. It is a trait of mankind; even more, it is the mysterious prime force of 
our universe, which gives a rhythm to the crooning of savages and the games of children and 
a geometrical form to the crystallization of salt.”
The problem of the relation between stability and change cuts right across the dogmas of the 
separation of powers, and has little, if any, relation to the problem of whether judges should 
have the power to make law. 
Legislatures and courts may both make mistakes in the timing of changes, and both may be 
either behind their time or before it:
“Nor does the simple asking of the welfare question guarantee that a correct answer will be 
given. But no matter how fallible legislators or judges may be in administering the test, it 
seems obvious that only considerations of the wholesomeness of a given change, at a given 
time, in a given society, and not abstract logical theories on the limits of stare decisis, can 
furnish intelligent guidance. And the test would seem particularly appropriate in a country 








    
 
 
 
 
 
